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by 
Christian Breede 
 
. . . let us study what sorts of influence preserve and destroy states, and what sorts preserve or 
destroy the particular kinds of constitutions, and to what causes it is due that some are well and 
others ill administered . . . we shall perhaps be more likely to see with a comprehensive view, 
which constitution is best, and how each must be ordered, and what laws and customs it must use, 
if it is to be best.1 
ABSTRACT 
Nation-building has become a very controversial topic in recent years.  From the Former 
Yugoslavia to Iraq and Afghanistan, the topic has generated much debate among policy makers, 
policy implementers, and academics. The contemporary literature on the issue of nation-building 
varies substantially on issues such as legitimacy, timing, order of development, and approaches.  
But nation-building as a concept is not one that is unique to the modern age.  Aristotle, in his 
Politics, addresses the key themes of legitimacy, timing of development, and approaches that 
emerge from the current literature on nation-building.  There are principles in Aristotle’s work 
that can be directly applied to nation-building efforts today.  Ensuring legitimacy through justice, 
simultaneous development, and an approach consistent with the mean will ensure a state becomes 
and remains stable.  These ideas, first proposed by Aristotle, remain relevant today. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
It has been done before, to an extent. Journalists, political scientists, and sociologists have turned to the ancients 
for answers but examples are few.  Robert Kaplan looked primarily to Sun-Tzu, Thucydides, and Machiavelli in his search 
for answers to modern problems in Warrior Politics.2  Articles, such as Seth Cropsey’s work on lessons for leadership 
derived from Homer’s The Iliad,3 have also appeared in journals attempting to do the same, while others tried to draw 
lessons for foreign relations from Xenophon, Plato, and Aristotle.4  However, despite the rich history of the greater Middle 
East, very little work has been done to ask what lessons the ancients may offer with respect to nation-building. 
The works of ancient philosophy and history offer timeless insight into modern questions.  Aristotle’s Politics is 
as relevant today as it was when it was written over two thousand years ago.  This article demonstrates that Aristotle was 
writing about state stability in Politics, exactly what contemporary authors Francis Fukuyama, Simon Chesterman, 
Antonio Donini, and others have argued over in the last few years.  Although the insight offered by these authors is 
valuable, recent history has violently demonstrated that something is lacking in the analysis.  Areas of the greater Middle 
East are no closer to self-sufficiency or stability than they were prior to the overwhelming attention the region received 
after September 2001.  The improvements that have been achieved are unsustainable without continuous foreign 
intervention. Some of the authors touch on the need to understand the socio-economic realities of regions that are 
receiving the nation-building efforts. This is where Aristotle brings insight.  The socio-economic realities are the single 
most important factor in ensuring a state is stable and self-sufficient. 
The term nation-building is not without its own controversy and confusion.  The same writers who have put such 
passionate pen to paper on the subject of state stability have also demonstrated the same passion in disagreeing about what 
nation-building really means.  As one author suggests, “a decade ago, nation-building became a term of opprobrium, 
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leading a significant segment of American opinion to reject the whole concept.  Ten years later, nation-building appears 
ever more clearly as a responsibility that neither the UN or US can escape.”5  As a result, current literature on nation-
building is now much wider in scope, depth, and breadth.  
Donini, Chesterman, and Fukuyama provide interesting perspectives on the nuance between nation-building and 
state-building with varying degrees of depth.  Donini, who provides the most shallow of three viewpoints on the definition 
of nation-building, suggests that “The underlying objectives of such interventions — peace, stability, development 
accountable governance — have become steadily more ambitious, wide ranging, and trusteeship-like than in the past.”6  
By focusing on stability and governance, Donini is referring to state-building as opposed to nation-building. Chesterman 
also writes about state-building by focusing on the institutions and governance issues as opposed to the question of 
common ethnic or cultural origins.  He suggests that “The modern state is a manifestation of political power that has been 
progressively depersonalized, formalized and rationalized; the state is the medium through which political power is 
integrated into a comprehensive social order.”7  Again, similar to Donini, Chesterman writes about state-building versus 
nation-building. Fukuyama provides probably the broadest definition, as it incorporates both the state and the nation. He 
argues that “Nations — that is to say, communities of shared values, traditions and historical memory — by this argument 
are never built . . . rather they evolve out of an unplanned historical-evolutionary process.”8  He suggests that 
reconstruction of institutions and economies is state-building.  However, Fukuyama’s work is entitled Nation-Building, 
not State-Building. He develops his line of argument further by suggesting that “Nation-building encompasses two 
different types of activities, reconstruction and development.”9  In Fukuyama’s eyes, nation-building is state-building plus 
development. For the purposes of this article, the term nation-building will be taken in the Fukuyamian sense to 
encompass both governance and the less tangible but equally important notions of political culture and community.  The 
state is the political regime that operates within an existing nation or nations.  It is the role of the state to bring together 
disparate national interests into a stable political regime.  
As Catherine Holland recently suggests in a review essay for Political Theory, turning to the political philosophy 
of the ancients can be a positive feature of contemporary scholarship. She states that “the most creative scholarship that 
speaks to dilemmas of our present emerges from sustained reflection on classical texts.”10  However, one should also 
exercise caution. In 2000, Richard Mulgan wrote “with so much at stake politically, there must always be a temptation to 
read the ancient texts in a way that suits one’s own position at the expense of distorting their historical meaning.”11  
Mulgan counsels against relying too heavily upon ancient works for modern insight.   
When it comes to the study of statecraft, Aristotle is a primary source.  As Gerald Mara suggests, “our studying of 
democratic institutions and cultures should never be entirely separated from our reading and rereading of Aristotle.”12  
This article will reconstruct the key arguments in Aristotle’s foundational text, Politics, as they relate to this very modern 
problem of nation-building. 
Born in 384 B.C., Aristotle was the son of Nicomachus, court physician to the king of Macedon, Amyntas II.  
After entering the Academy in 368, Aristotle traveled through much of the Aegean. He married and was eventually called 
back to Macedonia to serve as tutor to Philip of Macedon’s son, Alexander.  For three years he served as Alexander’s 
personal tutor. Upon the boy’s appointment as regent, Aristotle left once again for Athens where he established the 
Lyceum.  Following Alexander’s death in 323, Aristotle fled Athens under a cloud of suspicion.  He died in Euboea in 
322.13  As Richard McKeon writes, “an epoch in Greek history was brought to a close when Alexander [and] Aristotle . . 
. all died within somewhat more than a year.14  In his sixty-two years, Aristotle produced works on science, ethics and 
foundational texts on politics.     
Aristotle’s works on political matters represent the first recorded attempt to put political thought into a greater 
context.  In Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle states that “since politics uses the rest of the sciences and since, again, it 
legislates as to what we are to do and what we are to abstain from, the end of this science must include those of the others, 
so that this end must be the good for man.”15  Aristotle was clearly one of the first political scientists.  This article will 
reconstruct Aristotle’s argument, as presented in Politics, as they relate to these themes.  It concludes with a series of 
principles that emerge from this examination. These principles should be applied if nation-building is to be truly 
successful. 
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The Mean 
It is Aristotelian to seek the middle ground or mean between two extremes.  One of Aristotle’s key teachings is 
the concept of the mean.  The Concise Oxford Dictionary defines mean, aside from the mathematical or emotional 
definitions, as “a condition, quality, virtue, or course of action equally removed from two opposite (usually unsatisfactory) 
extremes.”16 In the Dictionary of Philosophy and Religion, William Reese defines the mean as “the doctrine that virtue 
lies between extremes (although closer to excess than to deficiency).”17  Both highlight the concept of moderation in their 
definitions. 
Reconstruction of the Aristotelian mean from the primary sources is somewhat abstract.  A definition does not 
appear in Aristotle’s works but the theory is practiced in both his Nicomachean Ethics and Politics.  The most effective 
description of the mean is found in Book VI of Nicomachean Ethics, where Aristotle identifies five types of knowing: 
scientific;18 art;19 practical wisdom;20 intuitive wisdom;21 and philosophic wisdom.22  These five types are recounted in 
Ethics in this order.  The types progress from the knowing, which is based upon belief “in a certain way and the starting-
points are known,”23 to the opposite extreme where one is able to “know things that are remarkable, admirable, difficult, 
and divine, but useless.”24  In Aristotle’s own words, scientific knowledge is seen as the most basic of understanding. In a 
spectrum, scientific knowledge is found at one extreme while philosophic wisdom occupies the other end (Figure 1).   
 
Figure 1: The Mean and Aristotle’s Concept of Knowledge 
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
According to Aristotle, philosophic wisdom — and Aristotle’s judgement is rather harsh on its utility — is 
enlightened and “divine” but ultimately useless.  Philosophic knowledge, or knowledge of more than just managing 
people’s affairs, is the extreme as “there are other things much more divine in their nature even than man.”25 Aristotle 
identifies practical wisdom, or knowledge that allows one to “see what is good for themselves and what is good for men in 
general,”26 as the middle point or mean on the same spectrum. Aristotle writes that “it would be strange to think of the art 
of politics, or practical wisdom, is the best knowledge, since man is not the best thing in the world.”27  Not only is this 
concept of practical wisdom important for effective governance, but its place as a middle position between two extreme 
forms of knowledge serves to illuminate the importance Aristotle places on the median.   
At this point, a brief examination of Aristotle’s definition of the state is useful.  In Book III of Politics, Aristotle 
admits that the definition “is at present a disputed question.”28  Even though Aristotle’s “present” was over two thousand 
years ago, the comment still rings true as debates continue as to exactly what constitutes a state.  Aristotle found that 
where some argued that a state is a sort of monolithic entity, others saw the state’s institutions as definitional.  But 
Aristotle suggests “a state is a composite, like any other whole made up of many parts; these are citizens.”29  The notion 
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of people being the key element in the states is not Aristotle’s alone and this fact simply reinforces its original importance.  
Thucydides, in The History of the Peloponnesian War, records Nicias, who states: “it is men who make the city, not the 
walls or ship with no men inside them.”30  According to Aristotle and his predecessors, a state is not about its institutions, 
but its people.  It would follow that a study on nation-building would need to study the people as well as state institutions. 
The Importance of Legitimacy 
According to Aristotle, a legitimate state requires justice and appropriate constitutions or a formalization of who 
should rule and how.  In Book I of Politics, Aristotle states “justice is the bond of men in states, for the administration of 
justice, which is the determination of what is just, is the principle of order in political society.”31  Aristotle sees justice as a 
foundational concept for effective governance. 
In Book III of Politics, Aristotle cites two different forms of justice, one from the perspective of democrats and 
the other from oligarchs.  For Aristotle, democrats are those who believe in the rule of the poor, and subsequently justice 
for them is defined as equality.  On the other hand, for an oligarch, one who believes in the rule of the wealthy, justice is 
defined proportionally to one’s wealth.  These two forms of justice are at odds; one preaches universal equality and the 
other equality qualified by wealth.32 
Patrick Coby, an expert on ancient political theory and philosophy, elaborates upon this: “Human beings would 
seem to be in agreement about nothing political.”33 There exists “one small patch of common ground upon which 
contending parties can stand and state their case.  This is Aristotle’s concept of distributive justice.”34  Aristotle’s works 
led Coby to a common cause in governance, the desire for justice.  By distributive justice, Coby is referring to the way in 
which Aristotle builds his case for the universality of its want.  The conflict centers on the prepositions upon which justice 
is built, not its presence or absence.  Everyone agrees that justice is required but they disagree on what justice means.  In 
Book V of Politics, Aristotle writes, “That a state should be ordered, simply and wholly, according to either kind of 
equality, is not a good thing; and originally based on a mistake, and, as they begin badly, cannot fail to end badly.  The 
inference is that both kinds of equality should be employed.”35 
When Aristotle writes of “kinds of equality” he is differentiating between an equality based upon “sameness in 
number or size”36 and an equality of “ratios.”37  While the first form of equality is obvious, the second is more abstract.  
Equality of ratios means that one out of two would be equal to two out of four, just as one out of two is unequal (by ratio) 
to one out of three.  For Aristotle, and this is Coby’s point on distributive justice, when conflict occurs, it is not over the 
idea of justice, but rather the distribution or form of the equality upon which that desire for justice is based (Figure 2). In 
other words, the parties in the conflict are mixing their concepts of equality.  Where one party sees itself equal in ratio, the 
opposing party sees its opposite as equal in number or vice versa, thus leading to conflict.  Conflict is thereby averted by 
accurately distributing justice in keeping with the appropriate “kinds of equality.”  It becomes a conflict between classes. 
The different classes — for Aristotle, the oligarchs and the democrats — must have their correct, corresponding concepts 
of justice imposed upon them.  Oligarchic justice upon a democratic constitution will lead to conflict and ultimately 
regime collapse. 
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Figure 2: Distributive Justice and it relation to conflict 
 
   
 
Equality of Size Equality of Ratio 
1     =     1 2/4     =     3/6 
2     ≠     3 1/3     ≠     1/4 
3,456     =     3,456 4/5     =     8/10 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Aristotle’s theory of the mean applies; justice is ultimately achieved through moderation.  It is vital, whether 
moderating different kinds of equality or desires.  Ronald Terchek and David Moore sum up this importance nicely, 
suggesting “neither arrangement is wholly right nor wholly wrong, a good regime will attempt to see the legitimacy and 
limitations of both views and attempt to arrange politics so that these classes enter into constructive negotiations rather 
than risk intense civil conflict.”38  Clearly, legitimacy requires a justice that is distributive. The desire for justice, from 
Aristotle’s point of view, is universal.  
Aristotle finds that “most people are bad judges in their own case . . . they agree about the equality of the things, 
but dispute about the equality of the persons . . . because they are bad judges in their own affairs.”39 It should be of little 
surprise that formalizing how such cases are judged would be an important part of his conception of legitimacy.  Aristotle 
indicates that justice requires formal systems of resolution. These systems, in general terms, are referred to as 
constitutions.  For Aristotle, a constitution is the “arrangement of magistracies in a state, especially of the highest of all.  
The government is everywhere sovereign in the state, and the constitution is in fact the government.”40  Aristotle’s 
opinion on the importance of constitutions is clear.  Justice means different things to different classes.  Justice is required, 
but what changes is the definition of justice depends upon the class in question.  Justice for a democrat is very different 
from justice for an oligarch. 
For Aristotle, a constitution brings unity between classes.  It allows judgement to be passed upon others with 
impartiality rather than basing it simply upon the opinion of the judge at the time.  With a written code identifying what is 
just and what is not, the constitution removes the partiality of the present because a law passes judgement, not a person.  A 
Agree to this… 
…but not to this… 
…leads to conflict 
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constitution, in this sense, lends legitimacy to the court.  But the importance of constitutions extends beyond the court. For 
Aristotle, the constitution lends legitimacy to the actions of government.  But Aristotle is not suggesting that constitutions 
are perfect; in fact he argues that they are imperfect.  Stephen Salkever suggests that “political rule is different from the 
others in that it is the rule over equals relative to imperfect but indispensable laws.”41 Salkever asserts that this is a 
typically Aristotelian conclusion on laws and more generally, on constitutions.42  Catherine Holland agrees: “[Institutions] 
are products of human action, and actors possess the capacity to shape and alter them.”43  Both Salkever and Holland have 
struck upon a key principle in Aristotle’s view of constitutions.  For Aristotle, there is a paradox when it comes to 
governance.  Governance, in broad terms rule over equals, requires laws that are removed from partial or biased 
judgments of individuals.  However, as people create these laws, they will be inherently biased or partial.  The solution is 
that these systems must be open to continuous adjustment or amendment.  A constitution is not an end in and of itself, but 
rather a process for governance. 
For Aristotle, legitimacy is composed of justice and constitutions.  The key is that the requirement for justice is 
not debated; its distribution within a given society is.  Justice, improperly distributed, will lead to conflict. This conflict is 
different for each society in question.  Aristotle would say that a concept of justice in one state would not necessarily 
work for another.  As for constitutions, it is not a difficult leap for one to agree that codifying the rules of governance is 
advisable. This codification must be sufficiently flexible to allow for it to grow, evolve, and even react to changes in the 
society being governed.  The constitution must account for the class realities of the state to which it is applied.  An 
oligarchic constitution imposed upon a state primarily of working-class citizens would fail in much the same way as a 
purely democratic constitution would fail in a wealthy state. 
The existing body of literature on nation-building does address legitimacy, but it focuses primarily on the 
interplay between justice and sovereignty.  Although the emphasis on justice is certainly consistent with Aristotle, it 
misses the point about the importance of justice being distributed, either universal equality or equality in proportion, in a 
fashion consistent with the socio-economic realities of the country in question.  It is interesting to note that Aristotle 
makes very little reference to the importance of sovereignty when it comes to the legitimacy of a state.  In its place, 
Aristotle sees an appropriate and flexible constitution as the key to legitimacy and, by consequence, the stability of the 
state.   
Sovereignty is something that several theorists on nation-building focus on. It is, however, inconsistent with 
Aristotle because, for him, a state is a natural phenomenon, a desire that “is implanted in all men by nature.”44  For 
Aristotle, the word sovereignty has little meaning.  A state is a natural desire because “he who is unable to live in society, 
or who has no need because he is sufficient for himself, must be either a beast or a god.”45  The current focus on elections 
or physical boundaries for development and reconstruction work is misplaced;  Aristotle would suggest that these do not 
ensure legitimacy.   Aristotle’s views on legitimacy are more nuanced and qualified and dependent upon the particular 
socio-economic reality at the time.  Elections are important, but they must include flexible constitutions and distribute 
justice in a manner appropriate to the society for legitimacy to be achieved. 
Timing and Order of Development  
Similar to his stance on the importance of legitimacy, Aristotle sees the timing and ordering of development as 
important.  However, true to form, his view is one of balance.  No single element — institutional, economic, or otherwise 
— should occur first.  The order and timing of the development varies from situation to situation.  Aristotle best expresses 
this in Books III to V of Politics.  In these sections, Aristotle discusses the forms of government and how they must match 
the socio-economic realities of the state.  This matching implies a requirement to vary the development of both institutions 
and society.  Both must be developed concurrently, not at the other’s expense or in sequence. 
In constructing this argument, Aristotle begins by outlining three forms of political power and subsequently their 
related perversions.  As Patrick Coby suggests, political power “is rightly exercised when it serves the common good and 
not the special interests of the ruling class.”46 Perversion occurs when political power serves the ruling class only.  The 
three forms identified by Aristotle are kingship, aristocracy, and polity; the corresponding perversions are tyranny, 
oligarchy, and democracy (Figure 3).47  Aristotle offers a succinct summary of the forms and their perversions:  
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The words constitution and government have the same meaning, and the government, which is the 
supreme authority in states, must be in the hands of one, or of a few, or of the many.  The true forms of 
government, therefore, are those in which the one, the few, or the many, govern with a view to the 
common interest; but governments which rule with a view to the private interest, whether of the one, or 
of the few, or of the many, are perversions.48 
For Aristotle, rule of the one refers to kingship and tyranny while rule of the few is aristocracy and oligarchy.  
Rule of the many is polity49 and democracy.  Aristotle sees these six constitutional forms as ordered pairs, with one 
potentially devolving into the other.  Kingship devolves into tyranny when the one stops making decisions based on the 
public good and instead makes them based upon his or her own good.50 A similar occurrence happens when aristocracy 
devolves into oligarchy.  Although Aristotle admits that of all the devolutions, that of polity to democracy is “least bad of 
deviation,”51 that same change in what could best be described as the locus of interest is what characterizes the transition 
of the third ordered pair.  When the locus of interest shifts from external to internal, the constitutional form has devolved. 
 
Figure 3: Aristotle’s Constitutional Forms 
 
FORM PERVERSION 
Polity Democracy 
Aristocracy Oligarchy 
Monarchy Tyranny 
 
 
 
But it is in Politics that Aristotle further develops this shift in the locus of interest and in it he alludes to his 
previous arguments about distributive justice.  Aristotle argues  
those who are equal in one thing ought not to have an equal share in all, nor those who are unequal in 
one thing to have an unequal share in all, it is certain that all forms of government which rest on either 
of these principles are perversions.52   
Coby elaborates even further by suggesting that when “politics . . . [cease to be] a service performed by rulers for 
the benefit of the ruled”53 it has been perverted in the Aristotelian sense.  Whether through the distribution of justice or in 
the interest of rulers, the constitutional forms shift when these things change. 
With the six constitutional forms now understood, their relationship with the timing of development can now be 
elaborated upon.  Aristotle never fully commits to suggesting one constitutional form is absolutely the best. He suggests 
instead that some are better than others. In the Politics, it is not surprising to find him proposing different forms at 
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different times.  This is intentional.  Aristotle is making the point that there is no single solution, no absolutely best 
constitutional form for every situation.  The form and society must match. 
For that which is nearest to the best must of necessity be better, and that which is furthest from it worse, 
if we are judging absolutely and not relatively to given conditions: I say ‘relatively to given conditions,’ 
since a particular government may be preferable, but another form may be better for some people.54 
In this statement, Aristotle makes his case as to why absolutes in politics are fallacious.  In suggesting that 
“another form may be better for some people” he is indicating the requirement for different constitutional forms to be 
applied in different situations.  Aristotle suggests “every city is composed of quality and quantity”55 and that if the poor 
outnumber the rich, “there will naturally be democracy . . . where the rich . . . exceed in quality more than they fall short 
in quantity, there oligarchy arises”56 which further reinforces the idea of constitutional forms matching the socio-
economic realities.  Aristotle is making a distinction of class in this case; this distinction is ignored at one’s peril.  In order 
for the forms and society to match, some development in both the constitution and in the socio-economic reality of society 
must occur together and into perpetuity and they must be tailored with class distinctions in mind. 
Patrick Coby, borrowing Aristotle’s own analogy, summarizes the concept nicely by suggesting that the “study of 
politics, just like gymnastic training, needs to consider what is the best constitution simply, what is best for a specific 
body politic, how existing constitutions came into being and how they can be made to endure, and what type of 
constitution is best suited to the average community.”57  In making them endure, both the form and society must be 
developed.  Further elaborating upon this idea of development, Ronald Terchek and David Moore conclude that “Aristotle 
. . . shows a persistent attentiveness to a world of inequality and power and who asks how individuals can learn to share a 
time and place in ways that respect the integrity of each and that enable moral flourishing.”58  For Aristotle politics is a 
continuous peaceful struggle, in itself a form of development.   
It is no surprise then that Salkever and Holland both conclude that representative, legitimate governance must be 
dynamic.59 It is a process.  As Gerald Mara points out in his review essay in Political Theory, “the best political 
arrangement turns out to be not the regime in which the most beneficial reigning dogma drives out all competitors but, 
rather, the one in which tensions, like that between oligarchy and democracy, fruitfully coexists.”60  This coexistence 
requires constant development across the socio-economic spectrum of a state.  No single dimension can be developed first 
and no single shortfall can be addressed first. They must all develop in a common direction. 
Aristotle sees governance as a process that must adapt to changes in the society it is trying to govern. Like a 
system of inputs and outputs in a feedback-loop, they are interdependent.  Development cannot be achieved in one sector 
alone or in a linear fashion; all sectors must develop simultaneously and at varying rates dependent on the situation at the 
time.  The debates in the contemporary literature on nation-building question whether economic development or 
institutional development should come first.  For Aristotle, this debate misses the point.  Development must be addressed 
simultaneously across all sectors. A template or model that will work in every situation is unrealistic.  Nation-builders, 
Aristotle counsels, need to analyse the situation within the state or region being developed and apply appropriate 
developmental strategies that are able to shift and adjust with the changing socio-economic realities.  Aristotle’s approach 
involves first identifying the socio-economic realities of the state and then applying a constitutional form that is consistent 
with those realities. 
Aristotle articulates the importance of identifying the socio-economic realities in his seventh book in Politics.  He 
states that the population is the most important of the “materials required by the statesman”61 and that a statesman “will 
consider what should be the number and character of the citizens, and then what should be the size and character of the 
country.”62  In identifying the character of the citizens, Stephen Everson suggests that Aristotle sees a basic characteristic 
for people. If someone is “to be rational”63 then that demands “that one chooses the good life, the life in which we 
exercise our disposition for virtue and such a life is contingent upon the existence of the state.”  For Aristotle, the search 
for the good life is a universal characteristic of humanity and it would seem that a state’s existence is necessary. 
In Aristotle’s second consideration, he argues that there is a basic characteristic of a country universal to all 
societies.  In Book I, Aristotle holds that property “is part of the household, and the art of acquiring property is a part of 
the art of managing the household; for no man can live well or indeed live at all, unless he be provided with 
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necessaries.”64  Everson elaborates upon this by stating “human development depends on the existence of the state.”65  
Concomitant with this, almost a side effect of property rights, is a greater propensity toward stability. Terchek and Moore 
point out that “property ownership is important to Aristotle: It provides citizens with a tangible stake in the republic. . . . 
their good is intimately tied to the good of the republic.”66  All people need their necessities.  These necessities are 
provided first through the household and later the state.  The state, through efficiencies and economies of scale, allows 
people to develop.  Not unlike Maslow’s famous hierarchy of needs,67 without the necessities enabled by the state, people 
will not develop to the good life that Aristotle argues we all desire. 
Several notable political theorists have argued that this approach creates a paradox.  The state removes certain 
freedoms yet one cannot be free to self-actualize (using Maslow’s more modern concept of Aristotle’s idea of virtue) 
without the state.  Salkever explains the paradox as a system of limiters and enablers. 
If there is a paradox at the heart of human politics, it is this: we need something authoritative in our 
emotional and dianoetic lives to restrain the tendency to unlimited acquisition and help develop the 
potential for practical reason and the virtues of character; but no person, no principle (or law), and no 
way of life can serve as a perfectly adequate and permanent authority.68 
Salkever’s take on the paradox alludes to the qualified importance Aristotle places upon governance and the 
subsequent need for constitutions to be flexible.  It assumes, however, that unlimited acquisition is a natural human trait.  
Gerald Mara, steering clear of the assumption made by Salkever, suggests that “the arrangement that on the surface seems 
to be most effective in fostering the highest good for human beings now emerges as one in which its members would be 
deprived of certain opportunities or potentials essential to their humanity.”69 
Perhaps most satisfying, however, is the explanation offered by Charles Taylor as quoted in Steven Everson’s 
“Aristotle on the Foundations of the State.”  Everson cites Taylor as saying “in the event of conflict, we should have to 
acknowledge that we were legitimately pulled both ways.  For undermining such a society we should be making the 
activity defended by the right assertion impossible.”70  Everson explains by suggesting that if we “regard citizenship of a 
state as a necessary condition of such as to be free — to develop in such a way as to realize one’s own nature . . . then 
such an opposition can only seem superficial.”71  The paradox, Everson and Taylor suggest is simply a nuance that again 
reflects the requirement for continuous development in governance.  Because no system of government will perfectly 
represent or protect the rights of its citizens, it must develop and change as the society it represents changes. 
The development of a system of government between extreme forms and shaping society between extremes of 
socio-economic conditions is a navigation of sorts.  Aristotle suggests this navigation represents the mean.  It should be 
clear how the concept of the mean applies to a state’s stability and, more importantly, how to create stability in a state 
where there is instability.  Aristotle rejects the notion of political absolutes or fundamentals.  Moreover, Aristotle rejects 
the notion that a single model for a regime is best in all situations.  Instead, Aristotle embraces a system of government 
that is tailored to the socio-economic realities of a given state: a system of government that is the mean of two potential 
extremes.  A democracy is not always the best. Tyranny is the only constitutional form that is never the best according to 
Aristotle.  Neither a monarchy nor a polity is always best.  Aristocracy and oligarchy are not the best regimes either.  It is 
the very fact that Aristotle never commits to a single constitutional form as best that demonstrates his commitment to the 
idea of the mean.  A combination of the forms, suited to the socio-economic realities, is consistent with Aristotle’s 
counsel. 
Catherine Holland, in her review of Jill Frank’s A Democracy of Distinction, cites Frank, who suggests that 
governments “require a nontotalizing commonalty. . . . a unity of the different.”72  It is here that Holland credits Frank 
with providing some added insight into the concept of the mean.  Thus far the mean has been best described as a centrist 
approach but Holland finds that Frank takes this to another level.  In her reading of Aristotle’s mean, Frank finds that it is 
more than just the centre in a left versus right debate or a “revaluation of an easy mediocrity.”73  Instead, Frank sees the 
mean “positioned between excess and deficit . . . a call to an ethics and politics of distinction.”74  For Frank, Holland 
writes, the mean is a co-dependence of ethics and politics.  It is for this reason that Aristotle places such emphasis on 
justice.  Politics without justice, achieved through adherence to the mean, is simply a perversion.  As Coby states, the 
perversion occurs when the notion that “politics . . . is a service performed by rulers for the benefit of the ruled”75 is lost.  
When this occurs, the mean is lost as politics are now divorced from ethics.  
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The character of a state depends upon the identification of the mean of the society, the way in which politics and 
ethics are combined.  But it is also an examination of “the mutually constitutive nature of political structure and individual 
character . . . [the] products of human action”76 whereby “reciprocity, dynamism, and recursiveness govern relations 
between and among politics and ethics, institutions and character.”77   
Recently, several sociologists and political scientists have identified this “reciprocity and dynamism” as a central 
feature to what is now commonly referred to as “social capital.”  Although much debate exists on the exact definition of 
social capital, Robert Putnam’s Bowling Alone explores a variety of elements that make up this term.  Using the same 
language as Frank, Putnam defines one of the key elements of social capital as “the principle of generalized reciprocity – 
I’ll do this for you . . . confident that down the road you or someone else will return the favour.”78  Reciprocity is a form 
of altruism.  Actions undertaken under the guise of reciprocity are completed without expectation of immediate rewards 
— at least in the short term.  In the long term, however, reciprocity is very much an act of self-interest.  Social capital, as 
defined by Putnam, indicates that a favorable reciprocal action is not expected immediately, but eventually, in some 
capacity.79  Putnam summarizes the concept through an observation by Alexis de Tocqueville, who himself seems to be 
hinting at a broader notion of Aristotelian virtue when he says that Americans “pursue self-interest rightly understood.”80   
When Aristotle writes of determining the character of a state, he is arguing for an appreciation of these ideas.  The 
character of the state is itself the mean between the politics of the state and the character of its citizens.  The character of 
the state is often best demonstrated by the degree to which reciprocity is present in the society.  In modern language, the 
amount of Putnamesque social capital present in a society can be a good litmus test for determining the character of the 
state. 
Aristotle’s approach, unique in the current literature on nation-building, is nuanced.  Based upon his larger 
concept of the mean, it involves determining the character of the state and then identifying and applying the appropriate 
constitutional form as a mode of governance for that state.  Once this match is made, the system must be sufficiently 
flexible in order to change and remain an accurate match.  The process is difficult to describe in theoretical terms and 
undoubtedly difficult to apply in real terms. As Holland suggests, it “is hard work . . . but it is also productive work,”81 
which will ultimately lead to long-term stability.  Failing to do so will lead to state instability. 
The central theme in Aristotle’s Politics is about stability.  Legitimacy, as discussed in Aristotle’s use of the 
concepts of justice and proper constitutions, is a means to stability.  Timing development in a way that is consistent with 
Aristotle implies timing development that will lead to a stable regime.  The approach advocated by Aristotle suggests 
matching constitutional form with socio-economic form not based upon what is right in some abstract moral sense but 
rather what will lead to a stable state.  Straying from any of these principles will lead to states that are short-lived.  For 
Aristotle, good governance is about stability. 
The legislator should therefore endeavour to have a firm foundation according to the principle already 
laid down concerning the preservation and destruction of states; he should guard against the 
destructive elements, and should make laws, whether written or unwritten, which will contain all the 
preservatives of states.  He must not think the truly democratical or oligarchical measure to be that 
which will give the greatest amount of democracy or oligarchy, but that which will make them last the 
longest.82 
Aristotle is not saying that democracy or any form of government is absolutely the best form, nor is he defining 
absolutely the best form of government.  Instead, he is arguing that the best form of government — democracy, polity, 
oligarchy, aristocracy, or monarchy — depends on what will be most conducive to stability. 
In a striking parallel with one of the main themes in the current literature on nation-building, Aristotle points out 
that when it comes to stability, it is often harder to keep it than to create it. “The mere establishment of a democracy,”83 he 
writes, “is not the only . . . business of the legislator . . . for any state, however badly constituted, may last one, two, or 
three days; a far greater difficulty is the preservation of it.”84  Chesterman and his co-authors, in Making States Work, held 
this as a defining feature in their collection of essays. They saw nation-building as something best aimed at states on a 
path to institutional failure rather than one that has already suffered it.85  It is interesting to note that Chesterman appears 
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to have touched on the same idea that institutions require adjustments constantly, not just when in crisis.  With this in 
mind, stability is clearly a central theme in Aristotle’s Politics. 
Aristotelian Principles of Nation-Building  
Stability emerges as a central theme in Aristotle’s work as it relates to nation-building. Once this focus is 
identified certain principles emerge from Aristotle’s work as it relates to nation-building, a concept itself concerned with 
stability.  In working toward stability, three principles emerge in Aristotle’s Politics: justice leads to legitimacy; 
continuous institutional and societal development must occur if a state is to be stable; and nation-builders must remain 
consistent with the concept of the mean. 
The first principle for Aristotelian nation-building is that justice leads to legitimacy.  The contemporary literature 
and Aristotle both indicate that legitimacy is a key feature in a regime’s stability.  What has not been agreed upon is how 
best to achieve this legitimacy. Aristotle suggests that justice is the best method for achieving true legitimacy.  Donini, in 
Nation-Building Unraveled, also argues that justice is the single element that will lead to an institution’s legitimacy.  
Terchek elaborates: “a good regime will attempt to see the legitimacy and limitations of both views and attempt to arrange 
politics so that these factions enter into constructive negotiations rather than risk intense civil conflict.”86 This is 
essentially Aristotle’s concept of distributive justice.  The parties must first see each other as equal in principle at which 
point the issue itself can be successfully and meaningfully debated. 
Continuous institutional development concomitant with continuous societal development is essentially a balance. 
This constitutes the second principle of nation-building.  Leslie Goldstein refers to this balance as the “tension between 
the necessary conditions of political life — physical security and societal community — and the highest goals of political 
life — the wisdom and human excellence that are required for happiness.”87 A static or sequential approach to nation-
building will simply fall short.  The system of governance must address the realities of the society it is to govern and it 
must adapt to any changes in that society. 
The third principle of finding the mean is one that is most consistent with Aristotle’s general philosophy.  As 
described earlier, it is more than just finding the middle ground or the average between two extremes; it is a blending of 
politics with ethics and moderation.  As Aristotle suggests in Book V of Politics, the “only stable principle of government 
is equality according to proportion, and for every man to enjoy his own.”88  This general theme of moderation is so 
important. Goldstein says: “Constitutions that do not have an adequate amount of power-sharing in their initial structure, 
[Aristotle] writes, are bound to produce bad [policy] in the end.”89  As Aristotle demonstrates, this bad policy will lead to 
instability.  
Using the organization and composition of a state’s military as an example, Aristotle demonstrates that 
governments that are not correctly arranged will collapse.  Aristotle points out that when “the country is adapted for 
cavalry, then strong oligarchy is likely to be established . . .  only rich men can afford to keep horses.”90  But Aristotle 
cautions that if a military is organized inconsistently with the socio-economic reality of the state, the government “raises a 
power against itself.”91  Institutions that do not reflect the society they are to govern will fail.  Institutions that are static, 
unable or unwilling to respond to changes in the socio-economic conditions of the state, are also doomed to collapse 
eventually. 
Historical Application 
The three principles of legitimacy, simultaneous development, and finding the middle ground constitute the 
Aristotelian view on nation-building.  Although the applications described below do not explicitly describe or condone the 
concept of a third party conducting nation-building (and what would likely have been simply referred to as conquest just 
the same), the application of the principles remains sound regardless of whether they are applied by the ruling class of the 
state in question or some outside agent.  The three principles of justice as a key to legitimacy, continuous societal and 
institutional development, and the importance of finding the mean, when taken together, produce a lasting, stable state.  
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Cutting across the last two principles is the requirement for the socio-economic profile of the state to be accurately 
matched with the form of governance being considered. 
Early in Politics, Aristotle applies these three principles to several contemporary examples.  At first reading, it 
would seem Aristotle is praising the regimes of Carthage, Sparta, and Crete.  Upon closer reading of the text, however, it 
becomes clear that he is in fact making a series of very pointed critiques of all three regimes.  He is indicating, principally 
in Book II of Politics, that the contemporary constitutions are worth examining precisely because they are flawed.   
We must therefore examine not only this but other constitutions, both such as actually exist in well-
governed states, and any theoretical forms which are held in esteem; that what is good and useful may 
be brought to light . . . we only undertake this inquiry because all the constitutions with which we are 
acquainted are faulty.92 
Although Aristotle states later that these regimes are “justly celebrated,”93 he is simply reinforcing the importance 
of comparative analysis and that just as much can be learned from bad regimes as good ones. 
With the first principle of legitimacy in mind, Aristotle examines the importance of what can best be described as 
populism through the idea that the system of governance must be understood and desirable by the people being governed.  
Aristotle also differentiates between the rule of law and the rule of the people (a sort of “check” against populism).  When 
referring to the constitution of Carthage, Aristotle states “The superiority of their constitution is proved by the fact that the 
common people remain loyal to the constitution.”94 Taken in isolation this would certainly imply unqualified support for 
the Carthaginian system, but Aristotle differentiates between what is good for the state and what is good for the people.  
Populism needs to be balanced; if unchecked it would produce a perversion of governance as pure democracy. 
For Aristotle, this check on populism originates from a differentiation between the rule of people and the rule of 
law (which originates from the people).   In what can best be described as customary law as opposed to decrees of the day, 
Aristotle finds that “surely all matters of this kind are better regulated by law than by the will of man, which is a very 
unsafe rule.”95  For Aristotle, regimes which tend to rule by decree — a category that populist regimes fall into — are 
reactionary, personified, and far from ideal.  But balanced with this is the need for the customary law to reflect, to some 
extent, the realities and wishes of the people.96  Here the notion of distributive justice becomes important.  It is not merely 
enough to determine that a law is just or unjust; the law’s justice depends upon the society upon which it is applied.  
In the governments of Lacedaemon [Sparta] and Crete, and indeed in all governments, two points have 
to be considered: first, whether any particular law is good or bad, when compared with the perfect 
state; secondly, whether it is or is not consistent with the idea and character which the lawgiver has set 
before his citizens.97 
What is just in one state will not necessarily be just in another.  Although the desire for justice is certainly 
universal, its achievement depends upon the conditions in the state in question. Populism is important because without it 
the constitution loses its legitimacy. But, taken too far it can lead to a reactionary and personified form of government that 
will not survive a peaceful transition.  Customary law can also be taken to a logical extreme that is harmful to a regime’s 
stability. When the will of the people is carefully considered, it will be unmoved by present pressures and the transitions 
of power will be more peaceful as governance is depersonalized, instead of institutionalized. 
The importance of Aristotle’s second principle of simultaneous development is seen through his examination of 
Carthage, Sparta, and Crete.  The division of labour, geographic realities, and the importance of taxation are all illustrated 
through Aristotle’s contemporary examples.  He states: “It would seem also to be a bad principle that the same person 
should hold many offices, which is a favourite practice amongst the Carthaginians.”98  Aristotle’s logic is simple.  
Responsibility for many tasks makes one weak in all and expert in none.  Specifically with respect to a state’s 
bureaucracy: “the offices of the state should be distributed among many persons,”99 not simply because it is fair, but also 
because “action familiarized by repetition is better and sooner performed.”100  Aristotle uses the example to prove the 
importance of developing a system of division of labour within a society. 
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The simple geography of a state will require unique efforts at development, both economic and diplomatic.  
Recalling two examples, both involving Crete, Aristotle demonstrates how geography dictates the political development 
within a state.  Crete enjoyed a degree of security because the island provided a natural defensive barrier from potential 
aggressors.  Aristotle continues, in more general terms, about the importance of understanding the region and not just the 
state when assessing the best form of government.  Neighboring states can ferment unrest in other states. 
Nothing, however, of this kind has as yet happened to the Cretans; the reason probably is that the 
neighbouring cities, even when at war with one another, never form an alliance with rebellious serfs, 
rebellions not being for their interest.  Whereas all the neighbours of the Lacedaemonians, whether 
Argives, Messenians, or Arcadians, were their enemies.  In Thessaly, again, the original revolt of the 
slaves occurred because the Thessalians were still at war with the neighbouring Achaeans, Perrhaebians 
and Magnesians.101 
In considering a state’s stability, one cannot examine the state in isolation; the role its neighbours play in regional 
stability is important as well. 
The final form of development addressed by Aristotle’s examples is taxation.  Examining the constitution of 
Sparta, Aristotle found it deficient because it had no method of building revenue outside that collected during their wars 
with other city-states.  Unless plundering the coffers of others, the Spartan “revenues of the state [were] ill-managed; there 
[was] no money in the treasury, although they are obliged to carry on great wars, they are unwilling to pay taxes.”102  
Without taxes, a particularly difficult situation develops: “the city is poor, and his citizens greedy”103 because they fail to 
see the benefit of taxation. More generally, development requires employment opportunities, both in the private sector and 
in the state’s bureaucracy; it also requires building relationships and understanding of the role played by neighbouring 
states upon the state in question.  Finally, it requires a system of revenue building; in its absence the state cannot function. 
The importance of the concept of mean is the third and final principle to Aristotelian nation-building.  Aristotle 
applies this principle in his contemporary examples by examining the application of law within a selected city-state, 
wealth distribution, and the importance of what Aristotle terms “the good life.”  Focusing mainly on Sparta, Aristotle 
examines these three applications by illuminating the shortcomings in the Spartan constitution. 
The first citation made by Aristotle against the constitution of Sparta relates to the inequality with which the law 
is applied.  His critique on the role of women aside,104 Aristotle is arguing for a tempered application of the rule of law 
that is consistent with his notion of practical wisdom.  For Aristotle, any leader of a state must have the sense of “what is 
good for themselves and what is good for men in general.”105 Without this, Aristotle cautions, the state will fall into a 
condition of greed and an insatiable desire to gain wealth.106  Sparta, Aristotle found, fell into this trap. The people refused 
taxation and their highest office, the Ephoralty, was prone to bribery.  Although constantly at war, the Spartans were 
“unwilling to pay taxes.  The greater part of the land being in the hands of the Spartans, they do not look closely into one 
another’s contributions.”107  This inability to tax creates a vicious cycle of a poor state coupled with greedy citizens.  
Aristotle also cites the Ephors as being increasingly susceptible to bribes as they were too concerned with personal gain at 
the expense of the state.108  This condition, known as avarice, is ruinous to a state’s stability. 
A second factor to consider in understanding Aristotle’s application of the mean to governance revolves around 
the idea of the distribution of wealth, most often characterized by property in Aristotle’s day.  As the notion of the mean 
suggests, the ideal of equitable distribution is not complete but neither is it that wealth be only in the hands of the few; it is 
somewhere in between.  For Aristotle, “property ownership is an essential characteristic of good citizens who do not have 
to please others to meet their needs.”109  In Sparta, Aristotle found that “While some of the Spartan citizens have quite 
small properties, others have very large ones; hence the land has passed into the hands of a few.”110  Recalling Aristotle’s 
concern for the Spartan propensity to avarice, the rationale for his caution is clear.  But this is not to say Aristotle 
favoured total equality either.  Instead, he suggests “how immeasurably greater is the pleasure, when a man feels a thing 
to be his own.”111  It is the balance between the accumulation of wealth and the need to refrain from avarice that Aristotle 
argues is the goal of good governance and something that the Spartan constitution lacked.  The property distribution laws 
that were part of the Spartan constitution kept property in the hands of the few.  Stability comes about through a 
navigation of the middle ground between the two extremes of avarice and charity.  For  
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the poor are always receiving and always wanting more. . . . Yet the true friend of the people should 
see that they be not too poor, for extreme poverty lowers the character of the democracy; measures 
therefore should be taken which will give them lasting prosperity; and this is equally the interest of all 
classes.”112   
Without a sense of a stake in the stability of the state, the citizens will revolt and the system of governance will 
not last.   
The final factor in understanding Aristotle’s application of the mean is found in one of his principle theories: the 
purpose of the state is the good life.113  Again, Aristotle found Sparta to be deficient in this respect.  He argues that for a 
state to be successful, it must aim at the highest good. 
And the preference given to one or the other class of actions must necessarily be like the preference 
given to one or the other part of the soul and its actions over the other; there must be war for the sake 
of peace, business for the sake of leisure, things useful and necessary for the sake of things 
honourable.114 
But Sparta, Aristotle found, sought only to go to war and did not strive for the life of “leisure and peace.”115 
Instead, the Spartans lost sight of the greater purpose of the state and simply sought war and empire.  Aristotle claims this 
is a new concept as many of his predecessors celebrated the Spartan constitution and the concomitant focus on conquest as 
just and noble.116  With the benefit of hindsight, Aristotle confidently states that the celebrants were mistaken for the 
Spartan empire no longer existed.  But, suggests Aristotle, even if the Spartan empire did remain “they have lost the better 
part of life!”117  In a scarily prescient passage, Aristotle concludes that neither “is a city to be deemed happy or a legislator 
to be praised because he trains his citizens to conquer and obtain domination over their neighbours, for there is great evil 
in this.”118  A nation that focuses only on the accumulation of wealth and ignores the higher good that a state should 
provide — leisure and peace — faces instability. Such a state cannot be sustained. 
Aristotle’s three themes of legitimacy, continuous development, and adherence to the mean are clearly 
demonstrated in his preceding critiques of the constitutions of Carthage, Crete, and Sparta.  The constitutions under 
examination by Aristotle were deficient in these respects and led to the downfall of the various regimes.  Carthage 
suffered under a constitution that encouraged populism, passing laws that addressed present issues without proper 
foresight, and institutions became personalized, which resulted in instability.  All three states did not adhere to Aristotle’s 
second principle of simultaneous development. Some ignored regional issues, while others taxed inconsistently.  Some 
failed to provide adequate employment opportunities within the public sector. Finally, Sparta was most deficient in 
Aristotle’s third principle of adherence to the mean.   The myopic focus on conquest left it deficient in the true purpose of 
the state: the good life. 
CONCLUSION 
The principles of legitimacy through justice, simultaneous development, and adherence to the mean can be teased 
from these classic works, both through Aristotle’s general philosophies and in his critiques of several constitutions from 
his day.  Although written over two thousand years ago, the teachings of this father of political science are still worthy of 
consideration today as many governments around the world find themselves engaged in exactly what is at the heart of 
Aristotle’s teachings: the search for stability. 
Aristotle’s first principle is centred on legitimacy; specifically that legitimacy comes about through a shared sense 
of justice by the state’s citizens.  This echoes and amplifies what Chesterman considers important in contemporary 
analysis.  Chesterman articulates that state institutions have to be depersonalized. It is this depersonalization that 
minimizes bias and favouritism, thereby leading to a sense of fairness and by extension, legitimacy. 
The principle of simultaneous development demands that the form of constitution match the society which it is 
trying to govern, while at the same time remain sufficiently flexible to accept input from society while also shaping 
society.  This implies that development cannot be focused on a single sector in isolation.  All sectors must be developed as 
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a system, responding to one another.  It is notable that Aristotle places little emphasis on security provided by force as a 
basis for development; he suggests licit opportunities are what lead to security.  With today’s myriad nation-building 
efforts, this means that any constitution must first enshrine the values of the people holding the power; that employment 
and opportunities will promote further security; and development will have to be driven from within the country, not by 
external forces.  This clearly speaks to Fukuyama and his contention, mentioned earlier in this piece, that nation-building 
and development are one and the same. 
The third and final principle for nation-building according to Aristotle is pursuit of the mean. In the contemporary 
environment, cultural understanding is vital.  Historic approaches to the question of how to address nuances, such as the 
tribal question in Afghanistan or religious differences in Iraq, have been varied and extreme.  The concept of the mean 
remains relevant today as any approach to nation-building that aims to bring about lasting development must navigate 
between the extremes often imposed – both externally and internally – upon failed and failing states.  Extremes in 
Aristotle’s view only lead to instability as it marginalizes more often than it unifies.  It behoves the modern political 
scientist to heed these lessons and continue to seek new ways to apply them.  Ancient political philosophy continues to 
stand the proverbial test of time and understanding these teachings can illuminate solutions to some of our most pressing 
contemporary challenges. 
Christian Breede is a PhD Candidate in War Studies at The Royal Military College of Canada. 
2009 
 
 
158 
Endnotes 
 
1Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, X.9, 1181b, pp. 17-22. 
2
 Robert D. Kaplan, Warrior Politics: Why Leadership Demands a Pagan Ethos (New York: Random House, 2002). 
3
 Seth Cropsey, “Command Classic: Homer’s Greek epic offers leadership lessons for modern warriors.” Armed Forces 
Journal, 144, no. 6 (January 2007), pp. 24-27, 39. 
4
 Philippe Constantineau, La Doctrine Classic de la Politique Étrangère: La cité et les autres (Paris: L’Harmattan, 1997). 
5
 Seth G. Jones and James Dobbins, “The UN’s Record in Nation-building.” Chicago Journal of International Law 6, no. 
2 (Winter 2006) p. 723. 
6
 Antonio Donini, Norah Niland, and Karin Wermester, “Introduction,” in Antonio Donini, Norah Niland, and Karin 
Wermester, eds. Nation-Building Unraveled?  Aid, Peace and Justice in Afghanistan, (Bloomfield: Kumarian Press, Inc., 
2004), p. 3. 
7
 Simon Chesterman, Michael Ignatieff, and Ramesh Thakur, “The Great Lakes and South Central Asia,” in Simon 
Chesterman, Michael Ignatieff, and Ramesh Thakur, eds., Making States Work: State Failure and the Crisis of 
Governance, (Tokyo: United Nations University Press, 2005), p. 2. 
8
 Francis Fukuyama, “Nation-building and the Failure of Institutional Memory” in Francis Fukuyama, ed., Nation-
Building: Beyond Afghanistan and Iraq, (Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2006), p. 3. 
9
 Ibid. 
10
 Catherine Holland, “Democracy Beside Itself.” Political Theory 34, no. 4 (August 2006), p. 495. 
11
 Richard Mulgan, “Was Aristotle an ‘Aristotelian Social Democrat’?”  Ethics 111 (October, 2000), p. 82. 
12
 Gerald M. Mara, “The Logos of the Wise and the Politeia of the Many” Political Theory 28, no. 6 (December 2000), p. 
859. 
13
 Richard McKeon, ed., The Basic Works of Aristotle, 3rd ed., (Toronto: Random House, 2001), p. v. 
14
 Ibid., p. vi. 
15
 All citations from Aristotle’s texts were drawn from McKeon’s work (see footnote 5) and will be noted throughout by 
reference to the Berlin Academy pagination.  As McKeon describes, this reference style, from the editions translated in 
the 1800s, has become the customary way in which to locate passages in Aristotle’s work as each reprint, edition, and 
collection will have different pagination. The Berlin Academy system brings consistency to the citation.  For example, the 
citation here is from Ethica Nicomachea, Book I, Chapter 2, page 1094, column a, lines 5 and 6.  It will be presented as 
Ethica Nicomachea, I.2, 1094a5-6 from now on. 
16
 R.E. Allen, ed., The Concise Oxford Dictionary, 8th ed., (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990), p. 735. 
17
 William L. Reese, Dictionary of Philosophy and Religion: Eastern and Western Thought (Amherst: Humanity Books, 
1999), p. 465. 
18
 Ethica Nicomachea, VI.3, 1139b, 32. 
19
 Ibid., VI.3, 1140a, 11. 
 
Journal of Conflict Studies 
 
 
159 
 
20
 Ibid., VI.4, 1140a, 28. 
21
 Ibid., VI.6, 1141a, 6. 
22
 Ibid., VI.7, 1141a, 25. 
23
 Ibid., VI.3, 1139b, 32. 
24
 Ibid., VI.7, 1141b, 7. 
25
 Ibid., VI.7, 1141a, 1. 
26
 Ibid., VI.5, 1140b, 10. 
27
 Ibid., VI.7, 1140b, 25. 
28
 Aristotle, Politica, III.1, 1274b, 35. 
29
 Ibid., III.1, 1274b, 40. 
30
 Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War, trans. Rex Warner (New York: Penguin Books, 1972), p. 530. 
31
 Ibid., I.2, 1253a, 35. 
32
 Ibid., III.9, 1280a, 10-15. 
33
 Patrick Coby,  “Aristotle’s Four Conceptions of Politics.” Western Political Quarterly 39, no. 3 (September, 1986), p. 
487. 
34
 Ibid. 
35
 Politica, V.1, 1301a, 39 to 1302b, 8. 
36
 Ibid., V.1, 1301a, 29. 
37
 Ibid., V.1, 1301a, 30. 
38
 Ronald J. Terchek and David K. Moore, “Recovering the Political Aristotle: A Critical Response to Smith.”  American 
Political Science Review 94, no. 4 (December 2000), p. 906. 
39
 Ibid., III.9, 1280a, 15-20. 
40
 Ibid., III.6, 1278b, 10. 
41
 Stephen Salkever,  “Whose Prayer?  The Best Regime of Book 7 and the Lessons of Aristotle’s Politics.” Political 
Theory 35, no. 1 (February, 2007), p. 39. 
42
 Ibid. 
43
 Catherine A. Holland, “Democracy Beside Itself.” Political Theory 34. no. 4 (August 2006), p. 496. 
44
 Aristotle, Politica, I.2, 1253a, 25. 
45
 Ibid., I.2, 1253a, 30. 
46
 Coby.  “Aristotle’s Four Conceptions of Politics,” pp. 500. 
 
2009 
 
 
160 
 
47
 Aristotle, Politica, IV.2, 1289a, 30 and Nicomachean Ethics, VIII.10, 1160a, 35. 
48
 Ibid., III.7, 1279a, 25-35. 
49
 In Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle expands on the idea of polity as “that which is based on a property qualification” 
(VIII.10, 1160a, 32). He calls this timocracy. Aristotle even admits and subsequently adopts for himself the convention of 
polity as synonymous with timocracy as the word does appear in Politics. 
50
 Ibid, VIII.10, 1160b, 10. 
51
 Ibid, VIII.10, 1160b, 20. 
52
 Politica, III.13, 1283a, 26-29. 
53
 Coby. “Aristotle’s Four Conceptions of Politics,” p. 500. 
54
 Politica, IV.11, 1296b, 7. 
55
 Ibid., IV.12, 1296b, 22. 
56
 Ibid., IV.12, 1296b, 27. 
57
 Coby. “Aristotle’s Four Conceptions of Politics,” p. 481. 
58
 Terchek and Moore, “Recovering the Political Aristotle,” p. 911. 
59
 Salkever. “Whose Prayer?” p. 42 and Holland. “Democracy Beside Itself,” p. 498. 
60
 Gerald M. Mara, “The Logos of the Wise in the Politeia of the Many: Recent Books on Aristotle’s Political 
Philosophy.” Political Theory 28, no. 6 (December 2000), p. 847. 
61
 Politica, VII.4, 1326a, 5. 
62
 Ibid, VII.4, 1326a, 6-10. 
63
 Stephen Everson, “Aristotle on the Foundation of the State,” Political Studies 36 (1988), p. 98. 
64
 Politica, I.4, 1253b, 24-5. 
65
 Everson, “Aristotle on the Foundations of the State,” p. 101. 
66
 Terchek and Moore, “Recovering the Political Aristotle,” p. 908. 
67
 Abraham Maslow described the rank-ordering of these needs as a pyramid with physiological as the base built upon by 
safety and security needs, followed by love and belonging needs, then self-esteem needs and finally self-actualization 
needs.  Maslow suggests that one cannot proceed to the next “level” without first meeting all the needs below it. The same 
could be said about a person’s need for the state. The state provides the safety and security needs that are required for the 
self-actualization that occurs when one achieves the good life. See “Needs,” in Miller-Keane Encyclopedia & Dictionary 
of Medicine, Nursing, & Allied Health.  6th ed., 1997 (Toronto: W.B. Saunders Company, 1972), p. 1071. 
68
 Salkever, “Whose Prayer?” p. 41. 
69
 Mara, “The Logos of the Wise and the Politeia of the Many,” p. 848. 
70
 Charles Taylor in Everson, “Aristotle and the Foundations of the State,” p. 101. 
 
Journal of Conflict Studies 
 
 
161 
 
71
 Ibid. 
72
 Jill Frank in Holland, “Democracy Beside Itself,” p. 496. 
73
 Ibid. 
74
 Ibid. 
75
 Coby, “Aristotle’s Four Conceptions of Politics,” p. 500. 
76
 Holland, “Democracy Beside Itself,” p. 496. 
77
 Ibid. 
78
 Robert D. Putnam, Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community (New York: Simon and Schuster, 
2000), p. 134. 
79
 Holland, “Democracy Beside Itself,” p. 496. 
80
 Putnam, Bowling Alone, p. 135. 
81
 Holland, “Democracy Beside Itself,” p. 496. 
82
 Aristotle, Politica, VI.4, 1319b, 3. 
83
 Ibid., VI.4, 1319b, 33. 
84
 Ibid., VI.4, 1319b, 36. 
85
 Simon Chesterman et al, eds. Making States Work: State Failure and the Crisis of Governance (Tokyo: United Nations 
University Press, 2005), p.3. 
86
 Terchek and Moore, “Recovering the Political Aristotle,” p. 906. 
87
 Leslie Friedman Goldstein, “Aristotle’s Theory of Revolution: Looking at the Lockean Side.” Political Research 
Quarterly 54 (June 2001), p. 329. 
88
 Aristotle, Politica, V.7, 1307a, 25. 
89
 Goldstein, “Aristotle’s Theory of Revolution,” p. 319. 
90
 Aristotle, Politica, VI.7, 1321a, 10. 
91
 Ibid, VI.7, 1321a, 22. 
92
 Aristotle, Politica. II.9, 1260b, 29-35. 
93
 Ibid., II.11, 1272b, 35. 
94
 Ibid., II.9, 1269b, 30. 
95
 Ibid.  II.10, 1272b, 5. 
96
 Ibid, II.10, 1272a, 38. Aristotle also states that “acting upon [one’s] own judgement, and dispensing with written law, is 
dangerous.”  
 
2009 
 
 
162 
 
97
 Ibid.  II.9, 1269a, 30. 
98
 Ibid.  II.11, 1273b, 20. 
99
 Ibid. 
100
 Ibid. 
101
 Ibid., II.9, 1270a, 5-10. 
102
 Ibid. II.9, 1271b, 10. 
103
 Ibid. II.9, 1271b, 15. 
104
 Ibid.  II.9, 1269b, 15. Aristotle’s view on the role of women is no longer consistent with contemporary Western values; 
however, his larger point is that laws must be applied equally, a view that is very much in keeping with modern, Western 
values.   
105
 Aristotle, Ethica Nicomachea, VI. 4, 1140b, 10. 
106
 Jowett translates this concept from ancient Greek into English as avarice, which has a more powerful connotation than 
simply the word greed. 
107
 Aristotle. Politica, II.9, 1271b, 10. 
108
 Ibid, II.9, 1270b, 20. 
109
 Terchek, “Recovering the Political Aristotle,” p 908. 
110
 Aristotle, Politica, II.9, 1270a, 17. 
111
 Ibid., II.5, 1263a, 40. 
112
 Ibid., VI.5, 1320a, 35-40. 
113
 Ibid., I.1, 1252a, 5. In the opening paragraph to Aristotle’s Politics, he states “if all communities aim at some good, the 
state or political community, which is the highest of all, and which embraces all the rest, aims at good in a greater degree 
than any other, and at the highest good.”  
114
 Ibid., VII.14, 1333a, 35. 
115
 Ibid., VII.14, 1333b, 1. 
116
 Ibid., VII.14, 1333b, 15-25. 
117
 Ibid., VII.14, 1333b, 25. 
118
 Ibid., VII.14, 1333b, 30. 
